Code Agents — Security

Learning Objectives

- Threat model for code agents; identify high-impact risks
- Map risks to concrete defenses and CI policy gates
- Design sandboxing, approvals, resource limits
- Plan monitoring, replay, and incident response

THREAT MODEL & ATTACK SURFACE

DEFENSES & CONTROLS

Attack Surface (inputs → tools → sandbox → CI)



Prompt & Indirect Injection

Prompt/indirect injection via docs/comments/tickets

Risk: Malicious instructions embedded in comments, docs, or tickets can hijack LLM behavior.



Figure 1: Web AI agents exhibit a significantly higher jailbreak rate (46.6%) compared to standalone LLMs (0%), highlighting their increased vulnerability in real-world deployment.

WHY ARE WEB AI AGENTS MORE VULNERABLE THAN STANDALONE LLMS? A SECURITY ANALYSIS

Prompt & Indirect Injection

Prompt/indirect injection via docs/comments/tickets

Risk: Malicious instructions embedded in comments, docs, or tickets can hijack LLM behavior.

Commercial LLM Agents Are Already Vulnerable to Simple Yet Dangerous Attacks



Figure 1. A user submits a mundane shopping request to their web agent. **Left:** The web agent begins by searching Google and finds a seemingly relevant Reddit page. **Center:** Upon reaching a trusted platform (e.g., Reddit), the agent comes across a malicious post by an attacker and is redirected to a malicious site. **Right:** On the malicious site, a jailbreak prompt coerces the agent into divulging private information or performing harmful actions.

[Commercial LLM Agents Are Already Vulnerable to Simple Yet Dangerous Attacks]

Prompt & Indirect Injection

Prompt/indirect injection via docs/comments/tickets

Risk: Malicious instructions embedded in comments, docs, or tickets can hijack LLM behavior.

Mitigation:

- Sanitize inputs from external sources.
- Use structured prompts and schemas.
- Isolate prompt contexts.

Insecure Output Handling

Insecure output handling (model text → shell/SQL/JS without validation)

Unsafe Execution of Model Outputs

Risk: AI-generated shell, SQL, or JS code may be executed without validation.

Mitigation:

- Validate and sanitize all model outputs.
- Use allowlists and wrappers for execution.
- **Require human review for sensitive actions.**

Secrets Leakage

Secrets leakage via logs/PRs/artifacts; repo traversal/clobber

Exposure of Sensitive Data

Risk: Secrets (API keys, tokens) may leak via logs, PRs, or artifacts.

Mitigation:

- Use secret scanning tools.
- Avoid logging sensitive inputs.
- Rotate and scope credentials tightly.

Network Abuse

Network abuse (SSRF, unpinned downloads, data exfil)

External Communication Risks

Risk:

- **SSRF** --- Internal resource access via crafted external requests
- **Unpinned downloads** --- Unverified packages or files; risk of tampering
- **Data exfiltration** --- Sensitive data sent to attacker-controlled endpoints

via network calls.

Mitigation:

- Deny default network access
- Pin dependencies and validate URLs
- Monitor outbound traffic
- Apply domain allowlists
- Restrict agent permissions:
  - **Read-only vs. read-write workspaces**
  - No default network access

Dependency Supply Chain Risks

Dependency supply-chain (typosquatting, postinstall scripts, licenses)

Malicious Packages and Typosquatting

Risk:

- **Typosquatting**: Fake packages with similar names to popular ones (e.g., reqests vs requests)
- **Postinstall Scripts**: Code that runs automatically after install; can execute malware
- **Licenses**: Risk of using incompatible or legally restricted packages

Mitigation:

- Use trusted registries
- Pin versions
- Scan for license compliance
- Block install-time scripts

Key Risks (coding agents)

- Prompt/indirect injection via docs/comments/tickets
- Insecure output handling (model text → shell/SQL/JS without validation)
- Secrets leakage via logs/PRs/artifacts; repo traversal/clobber
- Network abuse (SSRF, unpinned downloads, data exfil)
- Dependency supply-chain (typosquatting, postinstall scripts, licenses)

DEFENSES & CONTROLS

Architecture & Policy

- Least privilege: read-only vs read-write workspaces; no default network
- Approvals for sensitive actions; structured tool schemas
- Ephemeral containers/VMs per task; resource/time limits
- Provenance & signing: SLSA levels; Sigstore/Cosign

Validation Gates (CI)

- SAST/taint (Semgrep/CodeQL); secret scanning; license checks
- Coverage & diff thresholds; test requirements
- Command allowlists for shell; network/domain allowlists
- Block on policy violations; warn on low-risk issues

Policy Snippets

Ready-to-use CI/CD security controls

✅ **Shell Wrapper (YAML)**

- allowed_cmds: pytest, ruff, black, mypy, npm ci, npm test
- deny_network: true
- max_write_paths: src/**, tests/**
- block_patterns: rm -rf /, curl http://

✅ **Coverage/Diff Gates (YAML)**

- **min_coverage_delta: 0**
- **max_files_changed: 5**
- **require_tests_updated: true**

✅ **Sigstore/Cosign (Bash)**

```
cosign sign --keyless dist/*.whl
cosign verify --keyless dist/*.whl
```

✅ **SLSA Provenance (YAML)**

```
slsa_provenance: required
attestors: ["github-actions","ci-bot"]
```

Security Checklists (printable)

Phase	Checklist
Before Run	Pin deps; sandbox; no default network; read-only creds; enable logs
During Run	Record commands/diffs; approvals for sensitive actions; scan outputs; time/CPU caps
Before Merge	SAST clean; tests/coverage pass; license/secret checks; reviewer sign-off
After Merge	Monitor; rotate ephemeral creds; incident retrospective

Reading — Lecture 2

- OWASP Top 10 for LLM Apps (2025)
- CSET: Cybersecurity Risks of AI-Generated Code (2024)
- Do Users Write More Insecure Code with AI Assistants? (ACM/ArXiv)
- SLSA spec; Sigstore/Cosign quickstart; Semgrep & CodeQL intros
- Veracode 2025 GenAI Code Security Report; Apiiro 2025 risk study